领导权结构和CEO激励对企业创新的影响——基于战略新兴产业上市公司的经验数据

Effects of Leadership Structure and CEO Incentive on Innovation Activities:Based on the Data of Listed Companies in Strategic Emerging Industries

考察了不同领导权结构下CEO激励对企业创新投入的影响,采用研发支出占营业收入和总资产的比重来衡量创新投入指标,在控制了一系列影响创新的因素之后,得出了如下主要结论:(1)两职分离有利于创新投入;(2)在不同领导权结构下,CEO激励机制均对创新投入有正向作用,其中货币薪酬激励与创新投入强度呈"U"型关系;(3)两职兼任更有利于发挥CEO激励机制对企业研发的驱动作用。在采用相应的工具变量控制内生性后,以上结论依旧被支持。

We use the data of listed companies in strategic emerging industries to empirically examine the roles of CEO incentives on firms,innovation activities under different leadership structure.The proportions of R&D expenditure to operating revenue and to total assets are used as measures of intensity of innovation input.After controlling for other cofactors,Empirical evidence supports the following conclusions.Chairman and CEO concurrency has obviously negative effect on innovation input.Regardless of leadership structure,CEO incentive schemes have positive impact on innovation input,the impact of salary incentive on innovation input is"U"type.The effect of the incentives on innovation is promoted by chairman and CEO concurrency.The main results prove robust after controlling for endogenity with instrument variables.Some important policy implications are discussed.