博弈视角下电商扶贫对农村生产企业发展的影响

The Impact of E-business Poverty Alleviation on Decision-making and Development of Rural Enterprises in the Perspective of Game Theory

电商扶贫是有效推进我国精准扶贫、精准脱贫的重要抓手。通过建立农村生产企业和大型民营零售商组成的两级供应链,运用博弈理论得到不开展电商销售、开展电商销售及扶贫情形下的纳什均衡解,分析了电商销售以及民营企业扶贫和政府扶贫对农村生产企业增收脱贫的影响。研究表明:电商销售有助于农村生产企业增收脱贫;两种电商扶贫形式均可有效增加农村企业开展电商销售意愿;无论是单独补贴还是共同补贴,只要补贴的总力度相同,农村生产企业开展电商销售的投资水平及费用也相同;电商销售投资效率的提高、市场需求对电商销售的敏感性系数增加均有助于增加农村企业开展电商销售意愿;生产成本越低、销售价格越高,农村生产企业开展电商销售的意愿越强。

E-commerce poverty alleviation can effectively promote China’s precision poverty alleviation and accurate poverty alleviation.A two-stage supply chain consisting of a rural production enterprise and a large-scale private retailer is established in this paper.Nash equilibrium solutions are obtained using game theory on conditions under without E-commerce sales,developing E-commerce sales and poverty alleviation.Impacts of developing E-commerce sales,poverty alleviation by private enterprises and government respectively on the decisions and profits of rural production enterprises are analyzed.Research showed that E-commerce sales will help rural production enterprises increase their incomes to get rid of poverty;Both forms of e-commerce poverty alleviation can effectively increase the willingness of rural enterprises to develop e-commerce sales;Regardless of whether it is a separate subsidy or a co-subsidy,as long as the total intensity of subsidy is the same,the investment level and cost of developing e-commerce sales for rural production enterprises are the same;Both increase in the efficiency of developing e-commerce sales investment and the sensitivity coefficient of e-commerce sales to market demand would increase the willingness of rural enterprises to develop e-commerce sales;The lower the production cost and the higher the selling price,the stronger the willingness of rural production companies to develop e-commerce sales.