动态惩罚机制下公共项目承包商机会主义行为演化博弈

Contractor's Opportunistic Behaviors in Public Project Under Dynamic Punishment Mechanism Based on Evolutionary Game Theory

公共项目中,承包商为追求利益最大化利用自身优势以及信息不对称性采取机会主义行为,一方面损害了公共项目业主方的权益,另一方面影响了公共设施的正常营运。通过运用演化博弈理论分别构建静态及动态惩罚机制下的承包商机会主义行为及业主方监管策略博弈模型,并分析其演化均衡策略。结果显示,静态惩罚机制下承包方和业主方的演化博弈呈周期性变化,不能达到稳定均衡状态;动态惩罚机制下承包商与业主方的演化博弈呈螺旋收敛态势;承包商采取机会主义行为的初始概率不同,随时间收敛到不同的均衡值;提升最严重惩罚度可有效降低承包商机会主义行为的概率。基于上述研究,业主方可选择构建动态惩罚机制遏制承包商的机会主义行为。

In public projects,contractors take advantage of their own advantages and information asymmetry to take opportunistic behaviors in order to pursue the maximum benefit,which not only damages the rights and interests of the owners of public projects,but also affects the normal operation of public facilities. Through the use of evolutionary game theory,the contractor opportunism behaviors under static and dynamic punishment mechanisms and the owner-side supervision strategy game model are constructed,and their evolutionary equilibrium strategies are analyzed. The findings are the evolutionary process of the behavior of contractors and owners can’t reach equilibrium state and the behavior of the two groups presents cycle mode under fixed punishment mechanism. In contrast,the evolutionary process of the behavior of contractors and owners presents spiral convergence under dynamic punishment mechanism. If the initial probability of self-discipline behavior of contractors is different,the value of evolutionary equilibrium convergence is different. Based on the above research,the owner can choose to construct a dynamic punishment mechanism to curb the contractor’s opportunistic behavior.