税收征管、管理者权力与投资效率

Tax Collection & Management, Management Power and Investment Efficiency

论文以委托代理理论为依托,选取2011—2016年A股上市公司第一产业与第二产业为样本,借鉴Richardson的研究模型,分国有非国有,对企业投资效率、管理者权利及税收征管相互之间的关系进行了研究探讨,得出的结论为:企业投资行为受管理层权力的正向影响且受税收征管的负向影响,即过高的管理层权力会导致企业投资过度,而合理的税收征管能达到对企业非效率投资行为的有效遏制,且在非国有企业中管理层权力促进过度投资行为要大于国有企业中管理层权力促进过度投资行为;而对于企业过度投资受管理层权力之间的这种正向影响,可以通过合理的税收征管起到很好的抑制作用,且这一影响力在非国有企业中对企业非效率投资的抑制效果较之于在国有企业中的作用更为明显。

Based on the principal-agent theory, this paper selected the primary and secondary industries of a-share listed companies from 2011 to 2016 as samples, drew lessons from Richardson's research model, divided state-owned enterprises into non-state-owned enterprises, and studied and discussed the relationship between enterprise investment efficiency, managers' rights and tax collection and management. The conclusions were as follows: Enterprise investment behavior affected by the management power forward and is subject to the negative effects of tax collection and administration, the management of high power will lead to excessive investment enterprise, the reasonable tax collection and administration to achieve the efficiency of the enterprise investment behavior effectively, and the management authority in the non-state-owned enterprises promote excessive investment behavior than in the state-owned enterprise management power to promote excessive investment behavior;However, excessive investment of enterprises is positively affected by the power of the management, which can be well restrained through reasonable tax collection and management, and this influence has a more obvious inhibitory effect on the enterprise's inefficient investment in non-state-owned enterprises than in state-owned enterprises.