连锁董事网络与权益资本成本:影响效应及路径检验

Interlocking Director Network and Cost of Equity Capital: Influence Effect and Path Test

作为一种长期稳定嵌入于企业中的非正式制度安排,连锁董事网络能否通过资源获取和信息传递功能降低权益资本成本有待深入探讨。本文利用2009-2016年中国沪深A股上市公司相关数据,通过社会网络分析方法考察连锁董事网络对权益资本成本的影响效应和作用路径。结果表明,较高的连锁董事网络位置能够显著降低权益资本成本;在内生性检验和一系列稳健性测试后,上述结论依然成立。中介效应检验表明,经营风险和信息风险在连锁董事网络影响权益资本成本中均发挥了显著的中介作用,即较高的连锁董事网络位置可以通过缓解经营风险和信息风险来降低权益资本成本。结论为深入理解连锁董事网络影响权益资本成本的内在机制提供了经验证据。

As an informal institutional arrangement that is embedded in the enterprise for a long time,whether the interlocking director network can reduce the cost of equity capital through resource acquisition and information transfer needs to be further studied.The specific effect and impact path of the interlocking directors′ network on the cost of equity capital are examined by the social network analysis method through the data of A-Share listed companies in 2009-2016 years.The results show that the higher network location of the interlocking directors can significantly reduce the cost of equity capital of the enterprise;after the endogeneity test and a series of robustness tests,the above conclusions are still established.Further impact mechanism analysis and intermediary effect test show that operating risk and information risk play a significant intermediary role in the impact of the cost of equity capital on the interlocking director network,that is,the higher network location of the chain directors can reduce the cost of equity capital by reducing operating risk and information risk.The conclusion provides empirical evidence for in-depth understanding of the internal mechanism of interlocking director network affecting the cost of equity capital.