摘要
为了减缓知识溢出、维持竞争优势,企业在选择创新保护策略时往往需要在专利和技术秘密间权衡。以演化博弈理论为框架,构建中国情境下企业创新保护策略选择的博弈模型,并探讨模型演化均衡稳定性及演化稳定创新保护策略。在理论分析的基础上,引入有限理性假设及交互学习模式,依托Netlogo平台建立多智能体仿真模型,分析并验证了四种典型情形下制度约束、企业间交互学习对演化稳定创新保护策略的影响。最后,总结研究结果并给出政策建议。
Patents and technical secret are important methods for protecting innovation and sustaining competitive advantages.Firms often have to choose between patent and secret since they are to some extent paradox referring to a specific innovation.This paper explores how firms protect their innovation in China based on the evolutionary game theory.Then,a model is built on the Netlogo software platform combining the evolutionary game model and Multi-agent modeling method which allows us to implement bounded rationality and interactivities.The simulation is run with different gain parameters and the results are checked by cross-validation.Finally,this paper draws conclusion and puts forwards some suggestions.
作者
赵晓阳
Zhao Xiaoyang(College of Management and Economics,Tianjin University,Tianjin 300072,China)
出处
《中国科技论坛》
CSSCI
北大核心
2019年第3期124-131,共8页
Forum on Science and Technology in China
基金
国家自然科学基金项目(71732005)
国家自然科学基金项目(71472131)
关键词
创新保护
专利
技术秘密
演化博弈
仿真
Innovation protection
Patent
Technical secret
Evolutionary game
Simulation
