市场细分下考虑需求扰动的双渠道定价决策及协调研究

A Research on Pricing Decision and Coordination of Dual-channel with Demand Disruptions under Market Segmentation

针对一个拥有独立细分市场的制造商与一个传统零售商组成的双渠道供应链在面临需求扰动时的定价决策及协调问题,应用动态博弈,在市场需求无扰动的前提下,建立了市场细分下双渠道供应链的模型。当市场需求发生扰动时,对于集中式供应链,通过求解供应链系统最优利润的Karush-Kuhn-Tucker(KKT)条件,分4种情形讨论,得出了市场细分下双渠道供应链的最优价格及数量决策,并将其与无扰动情形的最优决策进行比较。对于分散式供应链,推导出供应链协调时,收益共享契约应满足的条件,证明了收益共享契约能够实现市场细分下双渠道供应链的协调。算例分析结果表明:当收益共享契约参数的取值在指定区间内,供应链总利润可提高约4.5%,同时实现帕累托改进。

Aiming at a double-channel supply chain made up of a manufacturer with an independent segment market and a retailer with a traditional channel, the pricing decision and coordination problems when facing the demand disruption are researched. Under the premise of no disturbance of market demand, a model of dual channel supply chain under market segmentation is established by applying dynamic game. For the centralized supply chain, how the dual-channel supply chain is priced and coordinated when the market demand is disrupted in four situations is examined and discussed by solving the Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) conditions of optimal profit under market segmentation, and then comparing it with the optimal decision without disturbance. For the decentralized supply chain, conditions are derived which the revenue sharing contract should meet when the supply chain is re-coordinated. The results of the example analysis show that when the value of the revenue sharing contract parameter is within the specified interval, the total profit of the supply chain can be increased by about 4.5%, and the Pareto improvement is realized.