理解自欺

Understanding self-deception

根据传统定义,自欺必须满足信念条件与意图条件。与之对应,似乎存在关于自欺的两个悖论:"信念悖论"与"意图悖论"。本文试图论证:所谓的"自欺悖论"是可消除的,自欺是一类基于常情常理即可理解的现象。文章分为三部分:第一部分,对自欺的定义作简要的考察(第一节);第二部分,处理自欺的"信念悖论"(第二节至第四节);第三部分,处理自欺的"意图悖论"(第五节至第六节)。文之所及,也将对"欺骗""信念""真诚""反思""理解"等概念作必要的澄清。

On the traditional model of self-deception, self-deceivers apparently must (1) hold contradictory beliefs, and (2) intentionally get themselves to hold a belief they know or believe truly to be false. Accordingly, it has been thought that this traditional model of self-deception raises two ‘paradoxes’: One concerns the self-deceiver’s state of mind-the so-called ‘static’ paradox. How can a person simultaneously hold contradictory beliefs? The other concerns the process or dynamics of self-deception-the so-called ‘dynamic’ paradox. How can a person intend to deceive herself without rendering her intentions ineffective? This paper aims to argue that, despite of various difficulties in understanding self-deception, actually there are no paradox to be involved in deceiving oneself, even when ‘self-deception’ is understood in the traditional model. The following discussion falls into three parts: The first part presents a brief survey of the definition of self-deception (§1), the second part focuses on the ‘static’ paradox (§2-4) and the third on the ‘dynamic’ paradox of self-deception (§5-6). The relevant notions of deception, belief, truthfulness, reflection, understanding, etc. will also be parenthetically examined.