基于博弈论的公交进站换道决策行为研究

Research on Decision Making Behavior of Bus Entering Lane-changing Based on Game Theory

针对公交进站强制换道行为的决策阶段,立足于现状调查,应用概率统计的方法,分析了公交换道位置的空间分布,提出了基于公交位置的强制换道概率模型。通过对公交驾驶员与目标车道跟随车驾驶员在换道决策阶段交互博弈的分析,考虑行车安全、时间、换道需求的收益,建立了换道博弈模型,然后结合上述概率模型,应用收益相等法求得混合战略博弈的纳什均衡点,得到公交车辆换道的理论最优混合策略。最后通过实际算例可知公交进站换道最优混合策略为:在距停靠站20 m处以53. 3%的概率选择强制换道。这与实际情况下公交换道决策阶段的运行特征相符,可为欲进站停靠的公交驾驶员及其影响范围内的社会车辆驾驶员安全驾驶提供理论参考。

With a focus on the decision-making stage of mandatory lane-changing behavior of buses arriving stop,this paper analyzed the spatial distribution of bus locations using the method of status survey and probability statistics,and proposed a mandatory lane-changing probability model based on bus locations.By analyzing the interactive game between the bus driver and the target lane following driver in the lane change decision stage,considering the benefits of driving safety,time and lane change demand,a lane changing game model was established.Then combined with the above probability model,the Nash equilibrium point of the mixed strategy game was obtained by applying the income equalization method,and the theoretical optimal hybrid strategy of bus lane change was obtained.Finally,through the actual example,we can know that the optimal mixing strategy for the bus inbound lane change is:to select the forced lane change at a distance of 53.3%from the stop station.This study result matches the operational features of buses’lane-changing decision-making behavior in real life situations,and thus provides a theoretical reference for driving safety to bus drivers and drivers of affected private vehicles.