摘要
本文通过构建基于信息不对称下的银行和企业在信贷市场的博弈模型,对商业银行与贷款企业信贷行为特征分析,重点研究了"商业银行在信贷市场引入第三方征信机构参与评议降低审贷成本"、"商业银行加强企业违约信息公示降低不良贷款率"问题,通过基于信贷倾向视角对商业银行不良资产影响的研究,提出了防范不良资产的可行性建议。
Commercial banks are important media in China's indirect financing,which play an important role in the steady opera-tion of the economy,and non-performing assets are important factors affecting the stable development of commercial banks.This paper constructs a game model of banks and an enterprise in the credit market based on information asymmetry,and analyzes the characteris-tics of credit behaviors of commercial banks and loan companies.It focuses on "the introduction of third-party credit bureaus in the credit market to participate in the review to reduce the cost of auditing loans" and "the commercial banks to strengthen the disclosure of corporate default information to reduce the rate of non-performing loans”.Research by the affects of non-performing assets of Chi-na's commercial banks based the perspective of credit tendency,this paper puts forward the feasible suggestions for preventing and dis-posing of nonperforming assets.
作者
钱晓东
QIAN Xiaodong(Shangluo Municipal Sub-branch PBC,Shangluo Shannxi 726000)
出处
《西部金融》
2019年第2期86-89,I0001,共5页
West China Finance
关键词
商业银行
不良资产
信贷倾向
China’s Commercial Banks
Preventing and Disposing
Non-performing Assets
Credit Tendency