摘要
对一个开辟线上直销渠道的制造商和一个双渠道零售商组成的供应链系统,考虑线下渠道促销努力及消费者搭便车行为,在零售商主导的Stackelberg博弈下,就线上价格是否一致,研究了各渠道的定价策略。结果表明:当制造商线上渠道基本市场份额较大时,对制造商和零售商来说,线上价格不一致是最优策略。当制造商线上渠道基本市场份额较小时,双方都倾向拥有线上价格的决定权;并且当制造商承担部分促销成本时,零售商能接受制造商决定线上价格。
For the supply chain composed of an opening online channel manufacturer and a dual-channel retailer, considering the sales efforts of offline stores and the free-riding behavior of consumers, the pricing strategy is studied with the retailer-dominated Stackelberg game in the condition whether the online price is consistent. The results show that online price inconsistency is the best strategy for manufacturers and retailers when the basic market share of manufacturer’s online channels is large. When it’s small, both sides tend to have the online price decision, meanwhile, the retailer can accept the manufacturer to determine the online price if the manufacturer assumes part of the sales cost.
作者
刘昊
王志平
李桃迎
LIU Hao;WANG Zhiping;LI Taoying(Transportation Management College,Dalian Maritime University,Dalian,Liaoning 116026,China)
出处
《计算机工程与应用》
CSCD
北大核心
2019年第4期248-254,共7页
Computer Engineering and Applications
基金
国家社会科学基金项目(No.15CGL031)
大连市科技计划项目(No.2015A11GX016)
大连市高层次人才创新支持计划项目(No.2015R063)
中央高校基本科研业务费(No.3132016306
No.3132017085)
关键词
多渠道
促销努力
搭便车
线上线下
价格一致
multi-channel
sales efforts
free-riding
online and offline
price consistent