金融监管结构是否影响宏观杠杆率

Does the Structure of Financial Regulation Affect Leverage?

金融危机以来,如何提升金融监管有效性,推动经济去杠杆,成为重大的理论和现实课题,然而鲜有研究从更深层次探讨金融监管结构的作用。本文从监管机构和监管模式两个维度出发,考察了金融监管结构对杠杆率的影响。研究发现:金融监管机构对杠杆率有显著影响,由中央银行负责银行业监管可以有效降低杠杆率;监管模式的直接影响并不显著,但与监管机构存在交互作用,在监管机构独立于中央银行的情况下,混业监管比分业监管更有效;监管结构有效性也取决于监管机构独立性,中央银行独立性提高可以显著增强去杠杆作用;不同发展水平经济体存在异质性,发展中经济体由中央银行负责混业监管最有效。本研究为更好推进监管体制改革提供了政策启示。

Since the global financial crisis, how to improve the effectiveness of financial supervision and promote economic deleveraging has become an important theoretical and practical issue. However, there are few in-depth studies concerning the impact of the financial regulatory structure on leverage. From the regulatory authority and supervisory model perspectives, this paper examines the influence of the financial supervision structure on the leverage ratio. Based on theoretical analysis of the underlying mechanism, the paper performs an empirical analysis using panel data of 67 economies. The paper shows that financial regulatory authority has a significant impact on the leverage ratio, and that the central bank is more effective at deleveraging when it assumes banking sector supervision, with its effect positively related to its level of independence. While the direct impact of supervisory model is not significant, it has an interaction effect with the regulatory authority. In the case that the regulatory authority is independent of the central bank, mixed supervision is more effective than separate supervision. Meanwhile, the regulatory effect is heterogeneous. In developing countries, the central bank mixed supervision structure is the most effective.