可证明安全的弹性泄漏基于证书加密方案

Provably Secure Certificate-based Encryption with Leakage Resilience

传统基于证书加密方案的安全性一般在理想环境下考虑,敌手无法获得方案的私钥.在现实世界中,敌手可以通过侧信道攻击获得方案的部分私钥,传统基于证书加密方案很可能被攻破.针对这种攻击,可构造弹性泄漏基于证书加密方案.首先形式化基于证书加密方案的安全模型,在该安全模型中,增强两类敌手的攻击能力,允许敌手通过侧信道攻击获得私钥的部分信息.接着构造一种新型的弹性泄漏基于证书加密方案.最后证明该方案在随机谕言模型下是选择明文安全的,并给出方案允许泄漏的界限.

The security of conventional certificate-based encryption scheme,in general,has been taken into account in an ideal environment,where the adversary cannot obtain the secret key of the scheme.However,in the real world,an adversary can gain partial secret key through the side channel attack,and the conventional certificate-based encryption scheme is likely to be breached.In view of this attack,a certificate-based encryption scheme with leakage resilience can be constructed.We first define a secure model of certificatebased encryption.In this model,the attack ability of the two kinds of adversaries is enhanced,and the adversary is permitted to get some information of the secret key through the side channel attack.Moreover,a new leakage-resilient certificate-based encryption scheme is constructed.Finally,this scheme is secure against chosen-plaintext attack in the random oracle model,and the permissible leakage bounds of the scheme are given.