摘要
从地方产业经营失败没有引发农民对基层政府的大面积抗议这一现象出发,本文利用"制度—组织—行为"分析框架,以东北特拉河镇的大鹅产业为例,阐释了项目化塑造基层政府产业干预行为及其风险分担机制的过程逻辑。与全方位干预地方产业不同,项目化时代,基层政府掌握产业项目的控制权,农户则拥有更多的产业经营自主权,前者采用了更具收敛特征的干预方式,由此建立起基层政府与农户的弱关联性。在此基础上形成的产业风险分担机制,不仅阻断了经济风险向政治风险转化,防范了农民集体抗议行为的发生,更是将风险界定到农民一侧,使双方风险共担变成了农民自担。
Starting from the phenomenon ofthe failure of local industry business to trigger peasants'large-scale protests against the government,this paper uses the"Institution-Organization-Behavior"analytical framework to explain the process logic of grassroots government industry intervention and its risk sharing mechanism shaped by project,taking the goose industry in the town of Telahe in Northeast China as an example.Compared with the government s all-round intervention in local industries,in the era of projects,the grassroots government takes control of industrial projects,farmers have more autonomy in industrial management,and the government adopts a more convergent intervention,and then establishes a weak association with farmers.The industrial risk sharing mechanism formed on this basis not only blocks the conversion of economic risks to political risks,prevents the occurrence of peasants protesting against the government,but also defines the risks on the side of farmers,changing the risk from both sides into farmers sharing themselves.
出处
《南京农业大学学报(社会科学版)》
CSSCI
北大核心
2019年第2期28-37,156,共11页
Journal of Nanjing Agricultural University(Social Sciences Edition)
基金
国家社会科学基金青年项目"城郊农村集体资产产权界定中的身份竞争及其对策研究"(17CSH069)
关键词
项目化
基层政府
地方产业
收敛性干预
风险分担
project-oriented
grassroots government
local industry
convergence intervention
risk sharing