从“股东”中心到“企业家”中心:公司治理制度变革的全球趋势

From Shareholder-centered to Entrepreneur-centered Paradigm:The Global Trend of Corporate Governance Reform

"同股不同权"股票的发行长期以来被认为是与"一股一票"的"同股同权"相比,不利于投资者利益保护的股权设计。然而,近二十年来,伴随着第四次工业革命浪潮的深入,越来越多的互联网相关企业选择发行AB双重股权结构股票上市。来自中国的阿里通过合伙人制度,腾讯通过"大股东背书"模式变相实现了"不平等投票权"股票的发行。公司治理制度变革由此出现从传统的股东中心向企业家中心的全球变革趋势,在股权结构设计上体现为从"同股同权"转变为"不平等投票权",在董事会制度建设上体现为从专职的内部董事为主转变为以兼职的独立董事为主,而在对外部接管角色认识上,则体现为从被视为重要的外部治理机制转变为在反并购条款中加入相关限制。本文在剖析公司治理范式从股东中心到企业家中心全球变革趋势下的理论和现实背景的基础上,从股权结构设计、董事会组织和反并购条款等三个方面梳理和总结了企业家中心公司治理范式全球变革特征,并揭示这种全球变革趋势背后所包含的经济学逻辑,为公司治理理论和实务界未来如何顺应这种全球变革趋势进行理论和实践的准备。

“Unequal voting rights”scheme for stock issuance has been considered as the ownership structure design going against the principle of investor protection compared with the“one-stock-one-vote”scheme.However,the past two decades have witnessed more and more IT enterprises have issued dual-class stocks among the fourth industrial revolution.Alibaba's partnership and Tencent's controlling shareholder endorsement model are also practically the form of unequal voting rights structure under the“one-stock-one-vote”scheme.In addition to the ownership structure shifting from‘one-share-one-vote’to‘unequal voting rights’,the board of directors'system has changed from the full-time internal director to the part-time independent director,while the external takeover has been regarded as from external governance mechanism into the restrictions in anti-merger terms.The reform of corporate governance system has therefore evolved into the global trend of corporate governance from shareholder-centered to entrepreneur-centered paradigm.Base on the analysis of the theoretical and practical background of corporate governance paradigm from the shareholder-centered into the entrepreneur-centered,this paper summarizes the reform feature of entrepreneur-centered corporate governance paradigm on the following aspects:the ownership structure,the board of directors'system and anti-merger terms,and finally reveals the economic logic behind this global trend.This paper has both theoretical and practical implications on how to reform corporate governance structure in order to follow the global trend from shareholder-centered to entrepreneur-centered paradigm.