独立董事参与度对CEO超额薪酬影响研究——基于深度与广度的双元视角

A Research on the Impact of Independent Directors' Participation on CEO Excess Return: Based on the Perspective of Width and Depth

本文以中国上市公司独立董事制度为政策背景,从深度和广度双元角度检验了独立董事参与度对CEO超额薪酬的影响。以2008-2015年中国沪深A股的2274家上市公司为样本,本文通过多种检验方法到以下结论:独立董事任期所反映的参与深度对CEO超额薪酬具有抑制效应;独立董事兼职企业数量所反映的参与广度对CEO超额薪酬具有促进效应。本文的研究结论表明,在中国上市公司独立董事任期硬性规定的约束下,独立董事任期的延长有助于促进董事会监督职能的有效发挥;而兼职多家企业的独立董事则会因为精力不足、监督动机受到其社会网络的抑制而削弱董事会监督职能。

We examine the impact of independent directors'participation on CEO excess return from the perspective of width and depth with China's specific regulations and policies on independent directors in Chinese listed companies.With the sample of 2274 Chinese listed companies of Shenzhen and Shanghai stock market from the period 2008 to 2015,we find that the independents'tenure reflecting depth of their participation has a negative effect on CEO excess return,and the independents'interlocks reflecting width of their participation has a positive effect on CEO excess return.Our findings are robust to a battery of tests,including endogeneity checks using instrumental variables,Heckman two-stage regression.Our findings document that under the restriction of China's regulations and policies on independent directors,longer independent directors'tenure means more effective board monitoring function while more interlocks undertaken by independent directors would hinder their monitoring role in the board.