基于Nash-Bargaining的区域内水权交易合作议价模型研究

Cooperative bargaining model for regional water right transaction based on Nash bargaining

针对江苏省水量水质双缺型水资源冲突问题,基于准市场交易模式,考虑水权交易决策主体各自议价能力,引用合作博弈理论方法,构建区域内跨行业水权交易Nash-Bargaining议价模型,并给出准市场条件下水权交易的最优价格。以江苏省工业、农业之间跨产业水权交易为例开展实例研究,分析交易水量、议价能力对水权交易价格的影响。研究成果表明:水权交易总量与水权交易单价呈现正向相关关系,但水权交易单价存在上限,价格天花板受政府部门调控影响;水权交易能够有效提升江苏省工农业主体的收益,同时交易水量与交易价格的升高均能够有效提升江苏省整体社会福利;在高交易水量情况下,水权交易购买方的议价能力对提升水权交易整体福利具有更强的作用。

Aiming at the conflict problem of dual-shortage of water amount and quality in Jiangsu Province,considering the bargaining powers of various decision-making bodies in the water right transaction,a Nash-bargaining cooperative bargaining model for the regional cross-industry water right transaction is established based on the quasi-market transaction mode by using the cooperative game theory.Then,the optimum price of water right transaction under the quasi-market condition is given.Finally,taking the cross-industry water right transaction between industry and agriculture in Jiangsu Province as an example,the case study is carried out to analyze the effects of transaction water volume and bargaining power on the price of water rights.The research results show that the total amount and unit price of water right transaction are positively correlated,but the unit price of water right transaction has an upper limit,and the price ceiling is affected by the regulation of governmental departments.The water right transaction can effectively promote the incomes of industrial and agricultural entities in Jiangsu Province.At the same time,the increase in the transaction volume and price can effectively enhance the overall social welfare in Jiangsu Province.In the case of high transaction water volume,the bargaining power of purchaser of the water right transaction has a stronger effect on improving the overall welfare of the water right transaction.