盈余管理、金融市场化与公司超额银行借款

Earnings management,financial marketization and excess bank loans

公司在获取银行信贷的过程中会通过盈余管理以满足会计业绩审核要求的行为已得到学者们的关注,但现有文献尚未研究公司在获得一定的银行借款后是否会继续进行盈余管理以获得超额银行借款.本文基于该问题,以2003年～2016年中国A股上市公司为研究对象,从应计盈余管理和真实盈余管理两个维度,考察了盈余管理行为与公司超额银行借款之间的关系.研究结果表明,应计盈余管理和真实盈余管理均与公司超额银行借款正相关;进一步,在考虑地区金融市场化程度之后,发现金融市场化弱化了应计盈余管理与公司超额银行借款的正相关关系,但增强了公司通过真实盈余管理获得更多超额银行借款的行为.本文从公司超额银行借款行为出发,同时结合金融市场化程度,拓展了会计信息质量与信贷资源配置的研究视角.

Firms’ managing earnings to get more bank loans have attracted academic attentions. While, when firms reach the bank loans targets, would they continue to manage earnings to get excess bank loans? This paper studies this question from the aspects of real and accrual-based earnings management using the data of Chinese A-share listed firms from 2003 to 2016. The results show that real and accrual-based earnings management both are positively related to the excess bank loans. In addition, when taking the financial marketization into account, the positive relation between accrual-based earnings management and excess bank loans is weakened, but the relation between real earnings management and excess bank loans is enhanced. This paper expands the study perspectives of earnings quality and credit resources allocation from excess bank loans and enriches the research of the macro environments’ influences on firm behaviors.