投资者保护、真实盈余管理与企业绩效

Investor Protection,Real Earnings Management and Corporate Performance

投资者保护是抑制公司治理中委托代理问题的重要措施,加强投资者保护的深度和广度,能够约束管理层为了私人利益最大化采取的机会主义盈余管理行为,进而降低其对企业绩效的不利影响。本文分析了真实盈余管理对企业绩效影响和投资者保护对企业绩效的影响,探讨了投资者保护水平的提高对真实盈余管理与企业绩效关系的影响。

Investor protection is an important measure to curb the principal-agent problem in corporate governance.Strengthening the depth and breadth of investor protection can constrain the opportunistic earnings management behavior adopted by management for maximizing private interests,thereby reducing its adverse impact on corporate performance.This paper analyzes the impact of real earnings management on corporate performance and investor protection on corporate performance,and discusses the impact of investor protection improvement on real earnings management and corporate performance.