摘要
考虑政府碳限额与交易机制,对由单一制造商与单一零售商构成的再制造供应链系统进行研究。基于斯塔克尔伯格竞争博弈理论,得出分散决策与集中决策下新品和再制造品的最优定价策略,进而得到再制造供应链成员及系统的利润模型,最后分析了碳配额价格对新品和再制造品定价决策的影响,并进行了两种决策结构利润的比较。研究表明:单位碳配额价格的提高不利于新品和再制造品的销售;供应链企业作为整体集中进行决策更有利于供应链总利润的提升。
Considering the cap-and-trade mechanism imposed by the government,we study a remanufacturing supply chain system consisting of a single manufacturer and a single retailer.Based on the Stackelberg competition theory,the optimal pricing strategy of the new product and the remanufactured product respectively under decentralized and centralized decision-making is obtained,as well as the profit model of the members of the supply chain and the system as a whole.Finally,the effect of the carbon quota price on the pricing decision of the new product and the remanufactured product is analyzed,based on which,the profits of the two decision-making structures are compared.The research shows that increase in unit carbon quota price is not conducive to the sales of the new product and the remanufactured product and centralized decision-making by the supply chain enterprises can better work to the improvement of the total profit of the supply chain.
作者
董慧
袁开福
Dong Hui;Yuan Kaifu(School of Business Administration,Guizhou University of Finance & Economics,Guiyang 550025,China)
出处
《物流技术》
2019年第3期57-59,共3页
Logistics Technology
基金
国家自然科学基金项目(71661003)
关键词
再制造供应链
碳限额与交易机制
博弈论
定价策略
remanufacturing supply chain
cap-and-trade mechanism
game theory
pricing strategy