颜色恒常性与罗素式意向主义

Color Constancy:A Problem for Russellian Intentionalism

主流的罗素式意向主义认为经验具有某种现象色彩等同于经验将某种独立于心灵的客观颜色赋予经验对象,然而,颜色恒常性给这种观点带来两类反例。第一类反例是两个具有不同现象色彩的经验将同样的颜色赋予对象,第二类反例是两个具有相同现象色彩的经验将不同的颜色赋予对象。罗素式意向主义者可以通过区分物体的内在颜色与可感颜色来消解第一类反例,然而这种策略却不能用于第二类反例,原因是第二类反例中可感颜色的同一标准并不是独立于心灵,这违背罗素式内容的要求。罗素式意向主义者的其他可能策略也难以解决第二类反例,因而其面临来自颜色恒常性的严重挑战。

Russellian Intentionalism typically holds that phenomenal character and intentional content supervene on each other.Due to color constancy,there are two categories of counterexamples to Russellian Intentionalism:(A)two experiences with different phenomenal attribute the same color to the object being perceived and(B)two experiences with identical phenomenal character attribute different colors to the object being perceived.Russellianists can dissolve the threat from counterexample(A)by being committed to sensible color.However,this strategy cannot be applied to counterexample(B).The problem for Russellsian Intentionalism caused by color constancy is hard to solve.