摘要
职业流动过程中关系人向求职者提供社会资本时,产生风险和收益两个方面的后果。可能的风险来源于宏观经济制度安排及人际关系结构对于社会资本运作的制约,制约越大,运作风险越高,越阻碍关系人给予社会资本。可能的收益来源于人情交换的给予—回报机制,或是基于信任的长期回报,或是基于激励的短期回报。相关数据分析表明,在中国特有的人情文化环境下,通过求职者—关系人—雇主的信任关系链和熟悉关系链,降低了社会资本的动员风险,保障了社会资本动员的收益回报,特别是基于信任的长期回报方式,成为一种同市场经济理性相抵消的作用力,使得社会资本动员表现出持久的稳定特征。
Job-search process involves favor exchanges between job seekers and their guanxi contacts.In this process,guanxi contacts face both risks and benefits from providing a requested assistance.Possible risks are generated by the constraints of institutional arrangements of candidate screening and trust embedded in interpersonal connections between job seekers and their guanxi contacts.The stronger the constraints,the greater risks guanxi contacts face,and the lower willingness of guanxi contacts to provide requested assistance.On the other hand,the benefits to guanxi contacts are embedded in the mechanisms of favor exchanges,either in form of long-term indebt and return or in form of short-term replay almost immediately after providing the requested assistance.Data analysis shows that in Chinese job-search processes,job seeker,guanxi contacts,and prospective employer build up trust chains and intimacy chains of interpersonal connects,which reduces the risks but secure the favor return mechanisms especially through long-term returns to indebt.These social capital mechanisms function to reduce the uncertainties due to short-term economic rationality,thus maintaining a stabile pattern of relationally-embedded job search process in China.
作者
边燕杰
孙宇
Bian Yanjie;Sun Yu
出处
《社会科学战线》
CSSCI
北大核心
2019年第1期231-239,282,共10页
Social Science Front
基金
国家社会科学基金重大项目(13&ZD177)