产业集聚会改进能源效率么?

Can Industrial Agglomeration Improve Energy Efficiency?

本文构建数理模型研究政府行为选择视角下产业集聚对能源效率的影响及作用机制。在此基础上,借助综合径向和非径向特点的EBM模型测度1999-2015年中国工业行业能源效率,分析产业集聚与能源效率的动态关系。结果表明,面对晋升博弈地方政府有充分激励伸出"攫取之手",促成表面的产业集聚。国有企业因政府有偏的干预目标而滋生道德风险,诱发地方政府和国有企业的双重预算软约束、导致资源错配,并且企业研发无法产生技术外溢以优化能源效率,抑制产业集聚释放节能减排潜力。

This paper construct a mathematical model to study the effect and mechanism of industrial agglomeration on en-ergy efficiency under the perspective of government behavior.Then we use EBM model which integrate the feature of radial andnon-radial DEA to estimate industrial energy efficiency of China from 1999 to 2011;analyze the dynamic relationship betweenindustrial agglomeration and energy efficiency.The result indicates that facing promotion game,local governments have suffi-cient incentive to extend"grabbing hand"to promote false industrial agglomeration;SOEs will breed moral hazard due to thebiased governments’intervention goals,which induces double soft budget constraint of local governments and SOEs,and leadsto misallocation of resources.Furthermore,the R&D cannot generate technology spillover to optimize energy efficiency.Thus theenergy saving potential of industrial agglomeration is prevented.