互联网信息服务业多元主体监管的演化博弈研究

A Research on Evolutionary Game of Multi-Agent Supervision in Internet Information Service Industry

政府部门在引入多元参与主体监管互联网信息服务业时,由于未能准确把握行业协会与公众的作用机理及对监管效果的影响,导致多元主体监管政策难以得到切实应用。笔者构建了多元主体参与下政府部门与互联网信息服务企业间的演化博弈模型,通过模型求解及数值仿真,分析多元参与主体对系统稳定演化结果的影响,同时揭示行业协会与公众的参与度水平处于不同阈值空间时各参与主体间关系。研究表明,行业协会与公众的参与对政府监管效果具有积极的促进作用;行业协会对系统达到最优情形具有更大贡献;公众的加入可能会使政府监管部门出现"懒政"现象。研究结果帮助政府部门明晰行业协会与公众的作用机理及对监管效果的影响,为今后更好地制定多元主体监管政策,实现多元主体监管模式提供帮助。

When the government departments introduced the multi-participating entities to supervise the Internet information service industry, due to the failure to accurately grasp the mechanism of action of the industry associations and the public as well as the impact on the regulatory effects, it is difficult to effectively apply the multi-agent supervision policies. The authors construct an evolutionary game model between government departments and Internet information service enterprises under the participation of multi-subjects. Through model solving and numerical simulation, it analyzes the impact of multi-participants on the stable evolution of the system, and reveals that the changes of the relationship between the participating subjects in different threshold spaces according to the degree of participation of the industry associations and the public. Studies have shown that the participation of industry associations and the public has a positive effect on the effectiveness of government regulation;industry associations have made greater contributions to the optimal situation of the system;the participation of the public may lead to the phenomenon of " lazy politics " in the government regulatory authorities. The research results help government departments to clarify the mechanism of action of industry associations and the public and the impact on regulatory effects, and help to better formulate multi-subject regulatory policies and achieve multi-subject supervision mode in the future.