保健食品安全风险监管行为激励相容机制研究

Research on Incentive Compatibility Mechanism of Health Food Safety Risk Supervision Behavior in China

针对我国保健食品安全风险监管过程中的信息不对称性及政府监管效率低下问题,运用博弈分析方法,引入消费者权益损失补偿系数,考虑企业名誉损失、企业内部奖励等因素,构建我国保健食品安全风险监管过程中政府与保健食品生产企业之间的激励相容机制模型,分析政府与保健食品生产企业之间的行为策略选择对保健食品安全风险监管的影响机制,并在此基础上提出提升我国保健食品安全风险监管效率的相关政策建议。

In view of the information asymmetry in the process of health food safety risk supervision in China and the low efficiency of government supervision, using game analysis method, the compensation coefficient for loss of rights and interests of consumers is introduced, taking into account the reputation loss of enterprises, internal rewards of enterprises and other factors. The incentive compatibility mechanism model between the government and the health food production enterprises in the process of health food safety risk supervision in China is constructed. To analyze the influence mechanism of behavioral strategy selection between government and health food production enterprises on health food safety risk supervision. On this basis, the paper puts forward relevant policy suggestions to improve the efficiency of China’s health food safety risk supervision.