大股东股权质押对企业创新投资的影响分析——基于创业板上市公司的经验证据

The Heterogeneity of Shareholders, Share Pledgeof Major Shareholdersand Innovation Investment

依据代理理论和资源基础理论,本文选取2011～2016年创业板上市公司作为样本,实证分析大股东股权质押行为对企业创新投资的影响机制。结果表明,大股东进行股权质押融资不利于企业创新投资,并且企业创新投资会随质押比例的提高而降低,在尽可能控制内生性问题后结论依然成立。进一步区分股东异质性后发现,大股东股权质押对企业创新投资的负向影响,存在于非国有控股企业组以及高持股比例组。研究表明,大股东股权质押后出于维护控制权地位的考虑,会产生风险规避倾向和掏空动机,从而影响企业的创新投资水平。

According to the agency theory and the resource-based theory, this paper selects the GEM listed companies from 2011 to 2016 as a sample to empirically analyze the impact mechanism of the shareholder pledge behavior of large shareholders on the innovation investment of enterprises. The results show that the equity pledge financing of large shareholders is not conducive to enterprise innovation investment, and the enterprise innovation investment will decrease with the increase of pledge ratio. The conclusion is still established after controlling endogenous problems as much as possible. After further distinguishing the heterogeneity of shareholders, it is found that the negative impact of the shareholder pledge of large shareholders on the innovation investment of enterprises exists in the non-state-owned holding enterprise group and the highshareholding ratio group. Research conclusions show that, considering the maintenance of the status of control right after the shareholder’s equity pledge, the risk aversion tendency and the short-term motivation will be generated, which will affect the level of innovation investment of the company.