堵还是疏:网店“以次充好”行为治理研究

Punishment Mechanism or Reputation Mechanism:Research on Governing Online Shops Selling Fakes

本文从电商平台上店铺"以次充好"的欺诈性销售行为出发,构建不完全信息动态博弈模型,并基于实践中的惩罚机制和信誉机制,对博弈模型进行扩展,以考察"堵"和"疏"的治理效果。研究发现:第一,电商平台上机会型店铺比例越高,消费者鉴别能力越强,消费者越倾向于选择不信任店铺;机会型店铺总是会寄送仿品以最大化其收益。第二,对店铺欺诈性销售行为的惩罚往往很难达到预期效果,平台并不会真正严厉地惩罚店铺,消费者权益难以得到有效保障。第三,信誉机制能够在一定程度上引导机会型店铺诚信经营以获得更高的长期收益,信誉机制下消费者也更加倾向于信任店铺。但信誉机制也存在虚假评论、消费者报告偏差等诸多问题,使其不能发挥应有的效果。本文的研究对于经济现实是一个很好的理论提炼,对于后续的学术研究以及电商平台的信誉机制改革也有一定的参考价值。

Based on the selling fakes behavior of online shops, this article constructs a dynamic game model of incomplete information and examines the governance effects of the punishment mechanism and the reputation mechanism. This article finds that: Firstly, the higher the proportion of opportunistic shops on the e-commerce platform, the stronger the consumer identification ability, the more consumers tend to choose distrust shops;the opportunistic shop will always send fakes to maximize its revenue. Secondly, the punishment for selling fakes is often difficult to achieve its desired results, because the platform does not really want to punish the shop severely. Therefore, consumer rights are often difficult to secure. Thirdly, the reputation mechanism can guide opportunistic shops to operate in good faith, and consumers are more inclined to trust shops. However, the reputation mechanism may not be able to play its role, because of fake reviews, reporting bias and many other issues. This article theoretically explains why online shops selling fakes, which may provide a certain reference for the improvement of e-commerce platforms.