“懒政”、综合政绩考核与政府机构改革

The Shirking of Government Officials, Government Performance Evaluation and Institutional Reform

"懒政"是一种隐性腐败,严重损害政府公信力。"懒政"的制度根源是什么?文章认为,这源于当前针对地方官员的综合政绩考核制度与不同层级政府机构职能不配套。综合政绩考核中最重要的两项指标是经济和社会指标,而两者是冲突任务,经济改革上要"去产能",社会保障上要保就业。"去产能"可能导致结构性失业,失业可能引发群体性事件。面对冲突任务,地方政府官员会顾此失彼,维持现状是最优选择,这就是"懒政"的制度根源。因此,要解决"懒政"问题,必须减少基层政府官员承担任务的冲突程度。要从纵向政府机构改革入手,重新调整各个层级政府间的任务分工,将冲突严重的一类任务由基层市县政府交给中央和省级政府承担。

It is a kind of recessive corruption for local government officials not to fulfill their duties, which tarnishes government credibility. What are the institutional roots of the shirking of govemment officials? This paper argues that it stems from the incompatibility between the institution of comprehensive performance assessment of local officials and the government agency function. The two most important performance assessment indicators are economic and social indicators, which are contradictory. Economic reform should reduce overcapacity, and social security should ensure employment. The fomier may lead to stmctural unemployment which may lead to group disturbanee. There are two kinds of contradictory tasks, local government officials will be put in a double squeeze facing two kinds of contradictory tasks. Maintaining the status quo is their best option, which is the institutional origin of the shirking of government officials. To solve the problem, we should reduce the degree of conflict of tasks. We should start with the reform of vertical institutions and redistribute tasks at all levels of government. Conflicting tasks should be handed over from county and municipal governments to central and provincial governments.