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晋升问题:锦标赛理论的贡献与挑战 被引量:15

The Topic of Promotion: The Contributions and Challenges of the Tournament Theory
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摘要 文章首先系统介绍了锦标赛理论的发展,强调其对理解科层及其晋升制度的生产性具有重要贡献。随后,文章指出锦标赛属于完全合约,而这使得锦标赛理论并不能很好地理解作为不完全合约产物的科层组织及其晋升制度所具有的政治性。在此基础上,文章认为科层组织内的最优晋升制度应该同时体现晋升安排的生产性和政治性,并在维护上级威权与激发下级努力、挑选优秀人才之间实现某种平衡。 This paper systematically introduces the development of tournament theory, and emphasizes its important contributions to understanding the productivity of the hierarchy and its promotion system. Then, the paper points out that the tournament theory belongs to complete contract theory and cannot well understand the political nature of the bureaucracy and its promotion system which are the result of the incomplete contract. On this basis, this paper argues that the optimal promotion system within the hierarchy should reflect both the productivity and the political nature of the promotion arrangement, that is, to achieve some balance between maintaining the authority of the superior and stimulating the efforts of the subordinate and selecting excellent talents.
作者 杨其静 杨婧然 Yang Qijing;Yang Jingran(School of Economics/Center for Organization and Firm Studies, Renmin University of China, Beijing)
出处 《经济社会体制比较》 CSSCI 北大核心 2019年第2期156-164,共9页 Comparative Economic & Social Systems
基金 中国人民大学2018年度"中央高校建设世界一流大学(学科)和特色发展引导专项资金"
关键词 科层组织 晋升 锦标赛 生产性 政治性 Hierarchical Organization Promotion Tournament Productivity Politics
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