摘要
本文通过借鉴不完全契约理论拓展了委托代理模型,指出在科学资助过程中存在目标设定权、资源配置权和绩效监督权三种基本权力。三种权力在委托方、管理方和执行方之间的配置方式形成了不同类型的科学资助组织模式,导致不同类型的科学资助机构。基于这一分析框架,本文对国外科学资助机构职能设置和组织制度变迁进行总体性描述,初步检验这一理论的解释力。
Drawing on insights from incomplete contracts theory,the paper expanded the principal-agent model by conceptualizing the allocation of control rights in goal setting,resource allocation and performance supervision among the principal,supervisor and agent.The authors argue that the different modes of scientific research funding and organization setting are derived from the variations in the allocation of control rights.And then,the article illustrates the new theoretical model in a historical review on the function of selected funding organizations.
作者
卢阳旭
龚旭
LU Yang-xu;GONG Xu(Chinese Academy of Science and Technology for Development,Beijing 100038,China;Bureau of Policy,National Natural Science Foundation of China,Beijing 100085,China)
出处
《科学学研究》
CSSCI
CSCD
北大核心
2019年第3期470-475,525,共7页
Studies in Science of Science
关键词
委托代理
目标设定
资源配置
绩效监督
principal-agent
goals setting
resource allocation
performance supervision