摘要
随着P2P网贷风险频发,过去的自担保、第三方担保等模式已不能满足行业进一步发展的需求。同时,P2P"去担保化"的呼声也愈演愈烈。基于此,本文对将保险这一风险转移机制引入到P2P网贷的增信合作进行了研究。通过结合行业状况,对P2P平台、投资者、借款者等各方引入履约保障保险前后的借贷行为进行博弈分析,并为未来我国P2P+保险模式的更好发展提出建议。
In the past,P2P platforms often use self-guarantee or third party guarantee for their risk management.However,those models are no longer suitable.This paper combines insurance,which is a risk transfer mechanism,with the online P2P lending.Based on the industry conditions,this paper conducts game theory analysis to the online P2P lending behavior before and after the introduction of performance guarantee insurance.We also provide suggestions for the future development of P2P+insurance cooperation.
作者
李旸
韩潇
LI Yang;HAN Xiao(School of Economics,Sichuan University,Chengdu 610064,China)
出处
《广义虚拟经济研究》
2018年第3期83-88,共6页
Research on the Generalized Virtual Economy
基金
广义虚拟经济专项资助项目[项目编号:GX2012-1011]
四川大学中央高校基本科研业务费研究专项项目(skyb201202
skzx2015-gb11)资助
关键词
P2P网贷
履约保障保险
序列博弈
online P2P lending
performance guarantee insurance
sequential game
