供应链视角下食品质量安全风险调控投资研究

Study on Risk Control and Investment of Food Quality and Safety from the Perspective of Supply Chain

食品供应链契约联盟中每一个节点企业进行食品质量安全风险调控的投资意愿,不仅受自身风险投资收益因素影响,还取决于链上其他利益关联主体的相互协同激励。以博弈论为基础构建食品供应链中供应商与制造商质量安全风险调控投资模型,研究结果表明:在一定条件下,供应商与制造商中的一方选择食品质量安全风险投资的概率是政府惩罚力度和投资补贴率的增函数,是另一方风险投入产出比和投资成本分担系数的增函数,是"搭便车"收益的减函数;风险投入产出比与投资补贴率之间具有一定的替代性,投资补贴机制对惩罚机制具有良好的补充作用;供应商质量安全风险投资的概率是风险传导治理投资协调系数的减函数,即其风险投资的概率与供应链整体质量安全风险投资的协调性正相关。

The investment willingness of every node enterprise in the food supply chain contract alliance to regulate and control the risk of food quality and safety is not only influenced by its own risk investment income factors, but also depends on the mutual synergistic incentives of other stakeholders in the chain. Based on game theory, this paper constructs an investment model for quality safety risk regulation of suppliers and manufacturers in food supply chain,the results show that: Under certain conditions, the probability of one supplier and manufacturer choosing food quality and safety risk investment is the increase function of government punishment and investment subsidy rate,is the increase function of the other side’s risk input-output ratio and investment cost sharing coefficient, and is the "hitchhiker" income reduction function;There is a certain alternative between the ratio of the input-output ratio and the investment subsidy rate, and the investment subsidy mechanism has a good supplementary effect on the punishment mechanism;The probability of supplier quality and safety risk investment is the reduction function of risk conduction governance investment coordination coefficient, that is, the probability of risk investment is positively related to the coordination of quality safety risk investment of supply chain as a whole.