信息不对称下多因素波动的应急数量弹性契约

Emergency Quantity Flexibility Contract of Multi-factor Volatility under Asymmetric Information

考虑突发事件导致市场需求大幅波动、市场价格随机波动,构建生产成本信息不对称时应急供应链的数量弹性契约模型,寻找最优定价及订货策略;与完全信息情形对比,分析突发事件的信息共享及其对供应链最优决策的影响程度。研究发现,在生产成本信息不对称情形下,突发事件发生时,虽然零售商设计的数量弹性契约可以有效体现真实生产成本,但对供应链协调不起作用。同时,如果市场需求规模缩减,制造商表现出隐藏信息行为,可以促使供应链整体效益增加。最后通过算例验证了这些结论。

Considering market demand and market price fluctuations due to supply chain disruption and emergencies,we deal with the situations by constructing an emergency quantity flexibility contract under production cost information asymmetry,and then derive the corresponding optimal equilibrium.Meanwhile,we make the comparison between the result with that of information symmetry,exploring the impacts of emergencies and the degree of information sharing on optimal decision of the supply chain.The conclusion shows that,if production cost information is asymmetric,the retailer can design quantity flexibility contracts to reveal the true production cost effectively under emergencies,but cannot achieve the coordination of supply chain.Simultaneously,when the demand reduces with the outburst of emergencies,the behavior of withholding information by the manufacturer can promote the overall efficiency of the supply chain.Finally,numerical experiments are given to verify the results.