摘要
在具身关系中技术"延展"还是"并入"身体的根本区别在于是否能引起"身体所有权"的变化,工具的"身体所有权"即工具不再是附着在身体上的单纯的物体,而是退回到身体的感觉运动装置。身体图式的开放性能够阐释身体与工具的耦合中导致运动和感官能力的变化,但会丧失朝向他人开放的可能性。人的"虚拟身体"作为一种从潜能到现实的可能性的天然倾向,能够糅合"身体图式"与"身体意象",兼顾感官、社会、文化的维度,可以为技术具身问题开启一种存在论意义上的理论维度。
There are differences between technological extensions and incorprations on technology embodiment,namely whether the technology give rise to a feeling of"body ownership"or not. One condition for being a part of the body,is that the technology becomes a knowing body part,in other words,something that is no longer a mere object attached to the body,but something that withdraws into the sensorimotor apparatus of the body. The openness of body schema in using technology or tools induces some changes in motor and sensory capacities,which will lose the possibility of being open to others. An essential aspect of the body schema is what Merleau-Ponty calls the"virtual body"( le corps virtuel),an imaginative dimension of embodied existence,which can bridges our body schema with the possible,which is being in body image. It is the body as a potentiality for action and as the ability to transform the actual world into a world of possibility. That can be unfold an ontological dimension for the issue of technical embodied.
作者
邵艳梅
吴彤
SHAO Yan-mei;WU Tong(Department of The History of Science, School of Humanities,Tsinghua University, Beijing 100084 , China)
出处
《自然辩证法研究》
CSSCI
北大核心
2019年第3期50-55,共6页
Studies in Dialectics of Nature
关键词
延展
并入
身体所有权
身体图式
虚拟身体
extension
incorporation
body ownership
body schema
the virtual body