从可证实性看唯我论的困境——维特根斯坦与维也纳学派的一个比较

On the Dilemma of solipsism from the Perspective of Verifiability——A comparison between Wittgenstein and Vienna Circle

有一种观点认为维也纳学派只是维特根斯坦思想的模仿者,本文试图以证实和唯我论的关系这个话题为切入点,讨论中期维氏、石里克和卡尔纳普在这个问题上的异同。由于科学语言是主体间可理解的,那么用来证实的经验陈述绝对不可能是唯我论的表述。他们都认为唯我论将一个形而上意义的"我"作用于经验领域,这样的陈述无法为科学提供经验的意义。但三人的依据却各自不同,石里克从实在的层面、维氏从日常语言的角度,卡尔纳普则立足于物理学语言来否定唯我论。这体现了他们之间的根本差异,维氏从来都不是真正的经验主义者,证实原则只是他从逻辑语言向日常语言过渡的一部分;而维也纳学派则是不折不扣的经验主义者,证实问题一直都是他们关注的焦点,因此他们只是试图用维特根斯坦的理论框架来支撑自己的观点。

There is a view that the Vienna Circle is just an imitator of Wittgensteinian thoughts. This thesis attempts to talk about the similarities and differences between the mid-term Wittgenstein,Schlick and Carnap from the relation between verification and solipsism. Because the language of science is intersubjective,the statements for verification are not solipsism. They all considered that the statements which are used in verification absolutely cannot be solipsistic. Since solipsism is a mixture of metaphysical "I "and experience,such statement is experimentally meaningless. But the three people are different in their reasons. Schlick,Wittgenstein and Carnap refute the solipsism respectively from the perspective of reality,ordinary language and physical language,which reflects the fundamental divergence among them. Wittgenstein has never been a real empiricist and verification was only a part of his transition from logical language to ordinary language. But Vienna Circle is thoroughly empiricist. The problem of verification has also been their focus,so they just tried to support their ideas with Wittgenstein’s theoretical framework.