面向关键设备维修服务的PBC合同与BI保险集成设计

Integrated Design of PBC Contract and BI Insurance for Critical Equipment Maintenance Service

近年来,随着大型设备的维修服务越来越多外包给设备制造商,性能合同(PBC)逐渐成为双方合作的重要合同选项,PBC合同是根据服务结果给予设备制造商补偿。大型设备的突发故障会给企业造成巨大的收益损失和资金流风险。面对PBC合同固有的缺陷,如何设计合同使风险降到最低、签订合同时是否考虑到双方的风险态度、是否需要引入第三方保险公司来解决突发状况下企业资金流风险问题,这些都是需要运营商亟待解决的问题。文章以大型设备的维修服务为例,针对PBC合同固有的缺陷,引入营业中断保险,考虑运营商和设备制造商的风险态度,运用马克维茨均值—方差效用模型,求解PBC合同里面的关键参数。该研究是比较少见的维修服务与金融跨界研究,较为详细地考虑到了签订合同的各种因素,能够有效地为决策部门提供指导。

In recent years, with more and more large equipment maintenance services outsourced to equipment manufacturers, the performance contract(PBC)has gradually become an important contract option for cooperation between the two sides. The PBC contract is to compensate the equipment manufacturer according to the service result. The sudden failure of large equipment will cause huge profit loss and capital flow risk to enterprises. Facing the inherent defects of the PBC contract, how to design the contract to minimize the risk, whether to consider the risk attitude of both parties when signing the contract, and whether to introduce the third-party insurance company to solve the problem of the enterprise capital flow risk under the sudden situation. These are the problems that need to be solved urgently by operators. This paper takes the maintenance service of large equipment as an example, aiming at the inherent defects of PBC contract, introducing business interruption insurance, considering the risk attitude of operators and equipment manufacturers, using Markowitz mean-variance utility model. Solve the key parameters in the PBC contract. This study is a rare cross-border study of maintenance services and finance, which takes into account the various factors of signing contracts in detail, and can effectively provide guidance for decision-making departments.