集体行动逻辑、社会资本嵌入与农户合作供给——基于静/动博弈模型分析

Collective Action Logic, Social CapitalEmbedding and Farmers’ Cooperative Supply——AnAnalysis Based on Static/Dynamic Game Model

[目的/意义]以自愿合作的集体行动仍将是我国农村公共产品的重要供给方式,然而,目前许多农村集体行动以失败而告终。本文研究目的与意义在于从农户自愿参与供给的角度,积极引入社会资本,促使农户由非合作博弈走向合作博弈,从而解决农村公共产品合作供给困境。[方法/过程]通过构建完全理性和社会嵌入下的两种博弈模型,探究静动态模型中的纳什均衡解,从而阐述农村集体合作行为成败原因。[结果/结论]博弈模型结果表明,农户在完全理性的静态博弈中容易陷入集体困境;而社会资本嵌入为农户走出非合作博弈困境、建立广泛意义的合作提供可能。因此,政府可以从保护和培育社会资本,维护社会规范、建立奖惩机制,创新多元的供给主体模式等多方面入手,积极引导农户之间由非合作博弈走向合作博弈。

[Purpose/Significance] Collective action with voluntary cooperation is still an important supply mode of rural public goods in China. However, many collective actions in rural areas end in failureat present. The purpose and significance of this study is to actively introduce social capital from the perspective of farmers’voluntary participation in supply, promote farmers from non-cooperative game to cooperative game, so as to solve the dilemma of cooperative supply of rural public goods.[Method/Process] By constructing two game models under complete rationality and social embeddedness, the Nash equilibrium solution in static and dynamic models is explored, and the reasons for the success or failure of rural collective cooperative behavior are expounded.[Result/Conclusion] The results of the game model show that farmer households are prone to fall into collective dilemma in a completely rational static game, while the social capital embedding provides the possibility for farmer households to get out of the non-cooperative game dilemma and establish a broad sense of cooperation. Therefore, the government can actively guide farmer households from cooperative game to cooperative game by protecting and cultivating social capital, maintaining social norms, establishing rewards and punishments mechanism, and innovating multiple modes of suppliers.