限价政策与公益性影响下药品双渠道供应链定价与协调策略

Pricing and coordination strategies in pharmaceutical dual-channel supply chain under the influence of price cap policy and public welfare

针对当前网上售药渠道与传统售药渠道产生的矛盾冲突,在考虑我国药品限价政策与医疗机构公益性的基础上,构建了药品双渠道供应链模型分散式与集中式决策下的理论模型,分析、比较了限价政策、公益性等因素对均衡价格和系统绩效的影响;并针对药品双渠道供应链的特点,从渠道合作角度出发,设计了"指导定价+固定支付"及"政府补贴+指导定价+固定支付"的协调契约。研究发现:最高限价管制下,降低最高限价有利于提高供应链利润和社会整体福利;当药品价格不受管制时,增加医疗机构公益性有利于提高药品供应链利润和社会整体福利。当医疗机构公益性较低时,分散式决策供应链利润小于集中式决策,"指导定价+固定支付"契约可协调药品双渠道供应链;当医疗机构公益性较高时,分散式决策供应链利润大于集中式决策,"政府补贴+指导定价+固定支付"契约可协调药品双渠道供应链。

The rapid development of pharmaceutical e-commerce provides a convenient and efficient way for self-medication. More and more pharmaceutical suppliers are distributing drugs through both medical institutions and online channels to increase profit. However, adding a new channel will damage the profit of medical institutions, which will cause channel conflict between the medical institutions and online pharmaceutical channel. Therefore, how to alleviate or eliminate channel conflict and realize supply chain coordination, as well as the win-win situation of supply chain members, is a serious problem needing to be solved. Aiming at the channel conflict in the pharmaceutical dual-channel supply chain, we establish theoretical models in the decentralized decision and the centralized decision of pharmaceuticals dual-channel supply chains respectively by taking into account China's pharmaceutical supply chain characteristics, such as the influence of price cap policy and public welfare. Then, we analyze the impacts of some parameters including price cap policy and public welfare and self-medication on the equilibrium results. From the perspective of cooperation between medical institutions and pharmaceutical suppliers, we proposed coordination contracts to realize the win-win situation between supply chain members and improve the social welfare under the dual-channel strategy of pharmaceutical suppliers. Finally, combined with the current pharmaceutical policy, we claimed the feasibility of coordination contracts and verified the effectiveness of the model on pharmaceutical dual-channel supply chain by the numerical examples. Firstly, we obtained equilibrium solutions of pharmaceuticals dual-channel supply chain under decentralized decision-making and analyzed the influence of the price-cap policy and public welfare on pricing strategies and systems performance. The result shows that when there exists a lower price cap, the optimal pricing of pharmaceuticals of medical institutions equals the price cap, and the price cap won't influence the online channel price. At this point, reducing price cap may reduce the profit of medical institutions, but it can increase the profit of pharmaceutical suppliers and enhance patient’s surplus effectively. As a whole, reducing the price cap can not only increase the profit of the pharmaceutical supply chain but also improve social welfare. When there exists a higher price cap, the pharmaceutical price of medical institutions has not been regulated, and public welfare becomes the main factor to influence pricing. A relatively high public welfare will decrease the marginal profit and pharmaceutical price of medical institutions while enhancing the patient’s surplus. Meanwhile, a relatively high public welfare can increase the wholesale price of pharmaceutical and then increase the pharmaceutical supplies’ profit. As a whole, increasing public welfare can not only increase the profit of the pharmaceutical supply chain but also improve social welfare. Then, we compared the performances of the system between the decentralized decision-making and the centralized decision-making. We found that the price of pharmaceutical institutions and online pharmaceutical price in the decentralized situation are always higher than those in the centralized situation. The profit of pharmaceutical supply chain in decentralized decision-making is less than that in the centralized decision-making when public welfare is low, at this point, the coordinated pharmaceutical dual-channel supply chain can transfer the system profit to realize win-win and maximize the social welfare. However, when public welfare is high, the profit of the pharmaceutical dual-channel supply chain is higher in the decentralized supply chain than that in the centralized supply chain. However, the social welfare in a decentralized system is always less than a centralized system. At this point, the coordinated pharmaceutical dual-channel supply chain cannot satisfy the participation constraints of supply chain members. The pharmaceutical supply chain should receive external subsidies to obtain more social welfare. Finally, to achieve a win-win situation and obtain optimal social welfare, we put forward the coordination strategies to alleviate the channel conflict of the pharmaceutical dual-channel supply chain. When the public welfare is relatively low, the “directiveness price combined with fixed payment” contract can achieve coordination of the pharmaceutical dual-channel supply chain. When the public welfare is relatively high, the “government subsidies + directiveness price + fixed payment” contract achieves pharmaceutical dual-channel supply chain coordination.