战略与策略的平衡抉择:再论“七七事变”后蒋介石的应对

Balance Choice between Macro-Strategy and Micro-Strategy: Chiang Kaishek’s Countermeasures after “July 7 Incident of 1937”

"七七事变"前,针对日本对华北的侵略,国民政府已经制定了整体应对战略。1937年7月7日卢沟桥事变爆发后,蒋介石的应对实际上可分为战略和策略两个层面:从战略上言,中国须通过全面战争方能解决中日问题。在此战略下,卢沟桥事变会否、应否影响总体战略部署,蒋在内心并无把握,但为了避免陷入被动,按照既定军事计划做出部署,属于一个军事统帅的本能选择。就卢沟桥事变本身而言,蒋希望能局部解决,并趁机派中央军进驻平津地区,防止日本夺取华北,但亦做好了全面开战的心理准备。为了局部解决卢沟桥事变,蒋通过应战声明及战略部署,希望令日军暂缓发动全面战争。在应对卢沟桥事变的过程中,蒋所获得的军事情报对蒋判断全局局势起到了关键性作用。虽然他通过外交渠道释放出中国有意和解的呼吁,并希望英美等从中调停,但军事上的准备却在加速进行。

“July 7 Incident of 1937”, the national government had formulated countermeasure strategies against Japanese aggression in North China. After “July 7 Incident of 1937”, Chiang Kaishek’s countermeasures can be classified into levels of macro-strategy and micro-strategy. Macro strategically speaking, the Sino-Japan issue had to be solved by war. Chiang Kaishek was not so sure as to whether “July 7 Incident” would influence his comprehensive strategic deployment. In order to avoid falling into the passive situation of war, Chiang Kaishek, by his instinct of military chief, made the military deployment in accordance with the established military planning. Chiang Kaishek hoped to gradually handle “July 7 Incident”, sent army forces to station in Peking and Tianjin, and made psychological preparations for the war to prevent Japanese occupation of North China. Meanwhile, Chiang Kaishek made speeches against Japanese aggression and launched strategic deployment to postpone the war. In the process of dealing with “July 7 Incident”, the military information played a critical role for Chiang Kaishek’s evaluation of the general situation. Though Chiang Kaishek expressed his appeal for reconciliation through the channel of foreign relations and hoped Britain and the United States to play the role of mediator, his military preparations had been accelerating.