摘要
当前,许多国家面临高耗能老旧建筑数量多,绿色改造传统模式融资困难等问题。本文在已有研究基础上,建立既有建筑绿色改造PPP模式,有助于缓解传统模式改造的融资困境,同时以有限理性为前提,建立了以政府群体和投资群体为博弈主体的演化博弈优化模型,分析在PPP模式下博弈双方的演化稳定策略。运用案例分析方法,通过参数改变模拟激励机制变化,确定不同激励条件下的演化稳定均衡。根据演化稳定均衡结果提出有助于推动投资群体进入既有建筑绿色改造PPP项目,促进绿色改造持续发展提出对策建议。
Nowadays, many countries face the difficulties of the large number of green retrofitting for old buildings with high energy consumption and the difficulty of financing the traditional mode of green retrofitting. Through literature analyzing, this paper established the operation mode of the PPP for existing building green retrofit, and established the evolutionary game optimization model of the government group and the investment group based on the premise of limited rationality. This paper also analyzed the evolutionary strategy of the game sides in the PPP mode. Through the case simulation, the evolutionary stable equilibrium under the change of parameters is further determined. At last, some reasonable suggestions were put forward to promote the investment groups to enter the existing building green retrofits and promote the development of green retrofitting.
作者
杨晓冬
张家玉
YANG Xiao-dong;ZHANG Jia-yu(School of Civil Engineering,Harbin Institute of Technology,Harbin 150001,China)
出处
《中国软科学》
CSSCI
CSCD
北大核心
2019年第3期183-192,共10页
China Soft Science
基金
国家自然科学基金(71473061)
关键词
PPP
既有建筑
绿色改造
演化博弈优化模型
城市更新
PPP
existing building
green retrofit
evolutionary game optimization model
urban regeneration