不可完全合约、内部性与城市公用事业政府监管的行政监督惰性

Incomplete Contract, Internality and Administrative Supervision Inertia in the Government Regulation of Chinese Urban Public Utilities

对城市公用事业政府监管的监督是剩余决策权延长配置的一种制度安排,也是政府监管治理体系的必要结构。但是长期以来,在被监管的城市公用事业领域中,违规、政府监管者失察的现象屡见不鲜,其中的一个关键因素就是起着基础监督作用的城市公用事业政府监管的行政监督出现了明显的惰性。运用不可完全合约、内部性和"规制俘虏"理论分析城市公用事业政府监管行政监督惰性的特征及成因,有利于提出重构城市公用事业—政府监管—行政监督治理体系的有效途径。

The supervision of urban public utilities'government regulation is an institutional arrangement in relation to the allocation of the extensional decision-making rights,and also an essential structure of the regulations in the governance system.However,for a long time,in the regulated public utilities sector,violations of regulations and oversight of government regulators have often been overlooked.One key reason is that an oblivious inertia is found in the administrative supervision.The paper analyzes the characteristics and reasons for the administrative supervision inertia by using the theory of incomplete contract,internality and the capture theory of regulation,which is conducive to proposing a new conceptual perspective to redefine and reframe the integrated strategies including urban public utilities,government regulation and administrative supervision.