委托-代理模式中的代理人经营管理问题及改进策略——基于激励机制视角

Agent Management Problems in the Principal-Agent Model and Improvement Strategies——Based on the perspective of incentive mechanism

委托-代理模式是现代公司治理的逻辑起点,是公司在管理困难情况下不断探索形成的管理模式。委托-代理模式实质上是委托人充分借用人才资源优势,利用代理人的专业管理技能和信息优势来破解自身不擅长的管理难题,是一种"借长板补短板"的明智之选。但是,由于信息不对称、委托人未能对代理人的经营管理行为进行综合考察和有效监督、经营目标未能达成高度统一等因素,代理人在经营管理过程中常会出现一些有悖于合约规定的行为,这将会阻碍公司业绩的提升和公司利润最大化的实现。代理人经营问题的形成是多种因素综合作用的结果。改善代理人的经营管理行为,不仅要对其进行全过程监督,还要对其实施全方位的有效激励。

The principal-agent model is the logical starting point of modern company management, and is a management model that companies continuously explore under difficult management conditions. The principal-agent model is essentially a wise choice for the principals to fully borrow the talent resource advantage and use the agent's professional management skills and information advantages to solve the management problems that they are not good at, which means taking advantages to compensate for the weaknesses. However, due to factors such as information asymmetry, principals' failure to comprehensively inspect and effectively supervise the agent's business management behavior, and the failure to be highly unified in business objectives, agents often have some behaviors that violate contractual provisions in the course of business management, which will hinder the improvement of company performance and the realization of the company's profit maximization. The formation of agent management problems is the result of various factors. To improve the agent's operation and management behaviors, it is necessary not only to supervise the whole process, but also to implement all-round effective incentives.