摘要
以2008年至2016年1692家A股民营上市公司为研究样本,实证检验了金融背景高管的聘任对民营企业债务融资的影响。结果表明,金融背景高管的聘任可以显著提高民营企业杠杆率,增加其债务融资比例,并且这种作用机制源于信息不对称水平的降低。
With the panel data of 1692 China’s A-share private enterprises which are listed from 2008 to 2016,this paper examines the influence of executives with financial backgrounds on debt financing in private enterprises.The results suggest that the hiring of financial background executives can increase the leverage ratio of private enterprises,by reducing the extent of information asymmetry.The results show that executives with bank background can more significantly increase the leverage ratio,compared with executives with other backgrounds.
作者
邢毅
王振山
Xing Yi;Wang Zhenshan
出处
《河南社会科学》
CSSCI
北大核心
2019年第3期60-64,共5页
Henan Social Sciences
基金
辽宁省教育厅项目(2017039)
关键词
金融背景高管
民营企业
债务融资
信息不对称
Financial Background Executives
Private Enterprises
Debt Financing
Information Asymmetry