公平偏好下基于促销努力的供应链协调

Coordination of Supply Chain based on Promotional Efforts under Fairness Preference

在供应商主导的二级供应链中,基于零售商促销研究公平偏好下供应链的收益共享与成本分担契约,通过分析零售商在契约下的最优策略得出契约协调时的参数关系。研究发现:在契约未协调时,零售商最优决策下契约参数的设定受到公平偏好的限制;收益共享与成本分担契约能协调供应链,但契约参数在不利不公平偏好和有利不公平偏好时具有不同的取值范围;公平偏好程度确定时,契约协调下零售商的效用水平受契约参数大小的影响;零售商有利不公平偏好程度特定时,参数间的关系不影响契约的协调性。最后通过数值分析验证了收益共享与成本分担契约协调供应链的有效性。

In the context of the two-stage supply chain where the supplier is the leader,based on the retail promotion of retailers,this paper studies the revenue sharing and cost sharing contract of the supply chain under fairness preference.By analyzing the retailer's optimal strategy under contract,the parameter relationship of contract coordination is obtained.The results show that:When the contract is not coordinated,the setting of the contract parameters under the retailer's optimal decision is limited by the fairness preference;The revenue sharing and cost sharing contract can coordinate the supply chain,but the contract parameters have different value ranges in the case of advantageous unfair preferences and disadvantageous unfair preferences;When the degree of fairness preference is determined,the utility level of the retailer under contract coordination is affected by the size of the contract parameters;When the retailer's advantageous unfair preference is specific,the size of the parameters does not affect the coordination of the contract.Finally,the numerical analysis is performed to prove the effectiveness of the revenue sharing and cost sharing contract in supply chain coordination.