道德行为归责的可能性——评聂敏里《意志的缺席——对古典希腊道德心理学的批评》

The Possibility of Moral Responsibility: A Commentary on Prof. Nie's Article “The Absence of the Concept of Will: A Critique of Classical Greek Moral Psychology”

本文审视了聂敏里《意志的缺席——对古典希腊道德心理学的批评》一文中提出的几个基本观点,即古希腊意志概念的缺席、康德意志概念的优越性、行为之道德属性应归责于意志以及赖尔对意志概念的消解之无效性,并对其各自做了回应。通过进一步的分析和考量,本文提出如下观点:(一)与狄勒"古希腊无意志"一说中所发现的、在古希腊哲学中缺席的意志概念,对应的是康德的自由抉择(Willkür)概念,而非其意志(Wille)概念——康德将道德的善恶归责于自由抉择,而非作为实践理性的意志;(二)康德也认识到了赖尔所批评的身心间因果作用的问题,而重视赖尔所提出的问题,有助于进一步理解康德将意志限制到道德领域的做法。

This article provide an analysis and comments on Prof. Nie Minli's article “The Absence of the Concept of Will: A Critique of Classical Greek Moral Psychology.” Based on Nie's argumentation, it examines his major claims, i.e. concerning the absence of will in classical Greek philosophy and the superiority of Kant's concept of will, how the moral quality of man's actions should be attributed to the will, and how Ryle's destruction of the concept of will is illegitimate. As an answer to Nie's statement, this article argues that what is diagnosed as absent in ancient Greece by Dihle corresponds to the notion of Willkür in Kant rather than the notion of will. Kant attributes the goodness or badness of actions to Willkür , but not to the Wille . Kant faces also the problem of the causal relationship between mind and body, as pointed out by Ryle;therefore, instead of taking Ryle as an antagonist, the problems revealed by him help us understand why Kant restrict the influence of will to the realm of morality.