高管激励、董事会独立性与研发投入——基于制造业的经验证据

Executive Incentive,Board Independence and R&D Input——Empirical Evidence Based on Manufacturing Industry

本文以2012-2017年中国A股制造业上市公司为样本,研究高管激励机制、董事会独立性与企业研发投入的关系,研究发现:高管股权激励机制与企业研发投入呈倒U型关系;高管薪酬激励机制与两职合一均与企业研发投入显著正相关;董事会越独立,其对高管激励与研发投入的正向调节作用越显著.该研究丰富了与执行高管激励和企业研发投资的相关理论研究.

This paper takes Chinese A-share manufacturing listed companies from 2012 to 2017 as samples to study the relationship between executive incentive mechanism,board independence and corporate R&D investment. The results show that:executive equity incentive mechanism and corporate R&D investment are inverted U-shaped relationship;executive incentive mechanism and job integration are significantly positively correlated with corporate R&D investment;the more independent the board of directors,the more aggressive it is to executive R&D investment. The positive adjustment of incentive and R&D investment is more significant. This study enriches the relevant theoretical research on executive i ncentives and corporate R&D investment.