供应链金融中“银电合作”模式激励机制研究

A Research on Incentive Mechanism of “Cooperation between Banks & B2B E-commerce Platforms” Model in Supply Chain Finance

文章探讨了以"银电合作"为基础的在线供应链金融激励机制。针对融资企业授信审查方式不同,应用委托-代理理论分别建立了联合授信下"银电合作"的双向道德模型与委托授信下"银电合作"的单向道德模型,给出了两种模式的最优契约。研究发现:两种模式的银行最优分配比例均是帕累托最优解,同时揭示了当利率、质押率和畅通性满足一定条件时,"银电合作"将由联合授信走向委托授信的原因。通过数值计算证实了文中关于参数改变对两种模式结果影响的结论。

This paper mainly discusses the online supply chain financial incentive mechanism based on“Cooperation between banks and B2B e-commerce platforms”.In view of the different methods of credit appraisal of financing companies,it applies the principal-agent theory to establish two models between the banks and the third-party B2B e-commerce platforms,one is the two-way moral model under the joint credit awarding mode and the other is one-way moral model under the entrusted credit awarding mode,which offers the optimal contract of the two models.It finds that the optimal allocation ratios of banks in the two models are all Pareto optimal solutions.Meanwhile,it also reveals that when the interest rate,the pledge rate,and the patency satisfies some certain conditions,the banks and the third-party B2B e-commerce platforms will be transferred from the joint credit to the entrusted credit.The numerical results verify the conclusion that the parameter change affects the results of the two models.