政府监管下的互联网众筹平台行为演化研究

Evolutionary Game Analysis of Operating Behavior Supervision of the Internet Crowdfunding Platform

互联网众筹平台作为项目发起人和投资者的中介,失职违规行为时常发生。针对众筹行业的监管问题,运用前景理论构建政府监管部门与互联网众筹平台的价值矩阵,动态模拟博弈双方策略选择过程并得出演化稳定结果,然后引入政府补贴这一变量,详细探讨激励机制对众筹平台行为的影响作用。结果表明,由于绝对风险厌恶系数的存在,政府补贴并不能时刻起到引导和规范众筹平台行为的作用。

As an intermediary agent between sponsors and investors,dereliction of duty and violation of regulations often occur on the Internet crowd-funding platform.For industry regulation,this paper innovatively applies prospect theory,builds the value matrix of government regulators and platforms,dynamically simulates the game strategy selection process and stable evolution results are obtained.By introducing the variable of government subsidy,the influence of incentive mechanism on the behavior of crowdfunding platforms is discussed in detail.The results show that due to the existence of ARA(absolute risk aversion),government subsidy cannot always work.