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不同付费模式下信用评级差异对债券定价的影响分析

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摘要 发债主体信用评级与债券定价息息相关,而我国债券市场信用评级虚高,且诱因或为发行人付费模式。研究发现:不同付费模式下的发债主体信用评级差异为债券发行市场带来了增量信息,并提升了债券发行利差,且投资者对民营企业的发债主体信用评级差异更为敏感。
作者 王祥凤
出处 《现代商贸工业》 2019年第18期110-111,共2页 Modern Business Trade Industry
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