打破“政商旋转门”如何影响股价崩盘风险——基于中组部18号文的准自然实验

How will Breaking the Politics-Business Revolving Door Affect Stock Price Crash Risks: A Quasi-Natural Experiment Based on No. 18 Document of the Organization Department of the Central Committee of CPC

利用中组部《关于进一步规范党政领导干部在企业兼职(任职)问题的意见》推出所带来的官员独立董事成批辞职的准自然实验,通过探讨"政商旋转门"关闭对股价崩盘风险的影响及作用机理,发现在非国有上市公司中,官员独立董事辞职显著降低了该公司的股价崩盘风险。进一步分析发现,外部融资依赖越高、所在地法治环境越差、寻租越严重、政府干预越多的上市公司,官员独立董事辞职的股价稳定效应越显著,从而说明"政商旋转门"关闭能够带来融资约束趋严效应、监管实施强化效应、寻租行为中断效应和政治负担减负效应,从而有效降低了股价崩盘风险。规范官员兼职等净化政商关系的规则和举措,有助于金融市场的稳定。

By making use of the quasi-natural experiment of the officials as independent directors resigning in groups resulted from the issuing of"The Opinions on Further Solving the Issue of Party and Government Leading Cadres Holding Part-time or Full-time Positions in Enterprises" by the Organization Department of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, this paper explores the impact and the action mechanism of the closing of the politics-business revolving door on the stock price crash risks. The findings show that in the non-state-owned listed companies, the resignation of officials as independent directors has significantly reduced the companies’ share price crash risks. The results of further analysis show that if the listed companies have higher reliance on external financing, worse legal environment of the location, more severe rent-seeking, and more government intervention, the stock price stabilizing effect after the resignation of officials as independent directors is more significant, which suggests that the closing of the politics-business revolving door can bring the financing constraints tightening effect, the regulation implementing strengthening effect, the rent seeking interruption effect, and the policy burden alleviating effect, all of these will effectively reduce the stock price crash risks. To standardize the rules and measures for the purification of the relationship between the government officials and the businessmen is helpful to stabilize the financial markets.